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1. Introduction: intermediate institutions and LAGs 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible benefits provided 
by intermediate institutions for the development of local communities. 
These are institutions that function essentially as a hinge coupling 
between the community (and its organizations) and the State (and its 
organizations). The first step is to address the question: exactly what are 
“intermediate institutions”? 
Intermediate, or meso-level institutions, are those “peripheral structures of 
the State, such as local bodies and institutionalized or semi-
institutionalized organizations (associations and unions of varying 
description, local banks), which have provided local systems with specific 
public assets” (Arrighetti and Seravalli, 1999, p. X). In effect, a distinction 
can be made between universal institutional assets (laws, defence of the 
territory, national infrastructures) and selective institutional assets 
(regarding categories of subjects or given territorial areas). Universal assets 
are provided by central institutions (States and, increasingly in the present 
day, supranational organizations); selective assets are the concern of 
intermediate institutions (sectoral organizations and local interests, local 
government structures, non-temporary cooperative and associative 
organizations, peripheral appendages of the State, local agencies, etc.). 
Intermediate institutions are set up primarily for governance of the 
territory and for the economic development of specific territorial areas 
(e.g. rural areas) or areas of interest (e.g. business clusters) and are entities 
tasked with offering public assets and services. From this perspective, the 
raison d’être of intermediate institutions depends on their capacity to 
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organize and coordinate a demand for control and for political mediation 
of interests, which cannot be provided at local level alone, and which 
cannot and should not (save in exceptional cases) be handled directly at 
national level (Sforzi, 1999). 
Beyond the taxonomy, however, it is difficult to define exactly what 
constitutes an intermediate institution, given that the attribute 
“intermediate” is relational in nature, and has meaning only if one 
identifies the elements that such an entity finds itself “between” 
(Lanzalaco, 1999). “Intermediate” covers the entire grey area between 
peripheral and central, between micro-level and macro-level. Accordingly, we 
refer here to a range of “meso governments” that vary depending on their 
purpose and on hierarchical level. Existing research into the role of 
intermediate institutions focuses predominantly on the economic and 
political aspects of local development. Our intention in this paper, by 
contrast, is to discuss the possible contributions that can be made by 
intermediate institutions to community development, that is to say, the 
process whereby members of the community come together to take a 
common action and generate solutions to shared problems (Heller et al., 
1984), and the activation of relational dynamics (interpersonal, intragroup, 
intergroup) capable of preserving and regenerating the social fabric 
(Amerio, 2000). It is a process that aims to create conditions for social and 
economic progress through active participation of the community 
(Rothman, 1974). Community development seeks to make individuals and 
groups aware of their responsibilities, giving them the capabilities they 
need to influence their community. These capabilities are often created 
through the formation of large groups working to a common agenda. 
Local development can be considered not only as economic growth, but 
also as an investment in social equity and environmental sustainability 
(Tobasura,1996). Thus, development becomes a notion centred on the 
quality of life enjoyed by people (Max-Neef, Elizalde, and Hopenhayn, 
1993) and on their ability and freedom to select the kind of life they want 
to live (Sen, 1990). 
In this paper, as intimated, we will look at the possible contributions 
that can be made by intermediate institutions to community development. 
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In particular, we will take a specific institution by way of example, namely 
Local Action Groups (LAGs), which we consider to be a prototype 
intermediate institution, but one also having characteristics that are 
entirely original, compared to other meso-level institutions (such as, for 
example, provincial or wide area entities). 
LAGs are cooperative-type associations between public institutions 
(municipalities, in the main) and private partners (businesses, 
associations, entrepreneurs, etc.) set up to favour the local development of 
a rural area. LAGs formulate a local development plan (LDP) and capture 
funding made available by the European Union. The activity of LAGs is 
characterized by three factors: (1) a clearly delimited and homogeneous 
territory; (2) public-private partnership, and (3) local development 
strategies promoted and implemented adopting a bottom-up approach. 
Accordingly, we will endeavour in the course of the next section to 
delineate the impact made by intermediate institutions in facilitating, 
directing or inhibiting community development. Thereafter, on the other 
hand, we will look at the specificities of LAGs in this sphere. 
 
 
2. Community development and the possible contributions of 
intermediate institutions  
 
The main avenues of community development, as suggested by Clinard 
(1970) and by Levine and Perkins (1987), include: 
 creating a sense of social cohesion, improving interpersonal 
relations and developing an awareness of belonging to one’s 
community; 
 supporting and stimulating self-help, voluntary service and 
other types of spontaneous association; 
 raising consciousness and informing citizens of important 
problems in the community and setting common goals for 
action; 
 identifying and promoting the abilities of local leaders; 
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 developing civic consciousness, mutual respect and dialogue 
between different cultures and ethnic groups in the community; 
 using the expertise of professionals and the know-how of 
researchers to support the mobilization of pressure groups and 
social change; 
 offering instruction in techniques of conflict management, 
decision-making and problem solving; 
 assisting with coordination between the action of the various 
services and the pressure of social action movements. 
Many of these functions can be identified with the ordinary actions of 
intermediate institutions. However, the benefits of collective action can 
outdo the advantages of individual action only when a series of 
constraints inherent in the coordination of individual patterns of conduct 
are overcome. Before projects are launched, in effect, individual social 
actors should provide one another with information key to subsequent 
decision-making, acquire the minimum technical skills needed to process 
different solutions, and align the various individual plans with the 
collective plan. Taken overall, these actions require resources, time and 
intellectual investments that increase exponentially as the number of 
actors involved becomes greater. Consequently, coordination on this level 
is seen as excessively burdensome and the collective project tends to be 
abandoned. Hence, the first task that should fall to intermediate 
institutions is ex ante coordination. 
For this to be possible, an intermediate institution should have some 
form of decision-making power. In practice, control over decision-making 
is hampered considerably if none of the actors involved wields effective 
authority. Whoever undertakes these tasks must have access to all the 
incentives for choosing efficiently (Grossman e Hart, 1986), and the right 
of exclusion is the function of private governing bodies. In the case of 
collective actions, the primary condition is exactly the opposite: non-
excludability, or expressed in positive terms, inclusiveness. 
Inclusiveness has meaning only if seen in a long term perspective. In 
reality, an intermediate institution influences the production processes of 
a territory if it is seen as a stable resource, constantly active and capable of 
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adapting to the changes brought by successive historical and economic 
events. Social actors (citizens, businesses, municipalities, trade 
associations, interest groups, etc.) must know that participation in the 
activities of a given institution is open “to all, and always”. 
Speaking of inclusiveness leads inevitably to the subject of participation 
and of active citizenship (the second of the possible contributions of 
intermediate institutions to local development). In literature, a distinction 
is made between mobilization and participation. Walgrave and Klandermans 
(2010) describe mobilization as the process that enables the initiation of a 
movement. The process of mobilization can occur in circumstances where 
individuals, groups and communities take measures to protest against an 
unfavourable event, a decision or an out-group, but also to invoke change 
or support a new vision of the problem. 
Participation, on the other hand, is described as a pool of behaviours, 
relatively stable over time and in different social contexts (Dalton, 2006; 
Norris, 2002; Talò et al., 2014). The typification of Teorell et al. (2007) 
makes mention of “pre-political” participation, different from the formal 
political participation typical of the political class and the élites of society 
(Brady, 1999). In effect, a large slice of the citizenry making up 
contemporary democracies is involved in non-formal political or semi-
political activities: i.e. activities not intended to influence administrative 
decisions directly, but at least to address problems affecting the 
community in any way. Schudson (1996; 1999) speaks of 'monitorial 
citizens’. According to this author, citizens are not as a rule interested in 
politics and feel that they have limited effectiveness politically, but when 
involved in decision-making processes, they stay interested, informed and 
active.  
We have noted that the second contribution intermediate institutions 
can make to community development, after ex-ante coordination, is one of 
facilitating participation. Indeed it is our belief that one of their tasks 
should be precisely to create mobilization around a project, and convert 
this same mobilization into participation. Mobilization can be tied to the 
initial planning of measures or, subsequently, to direct involvement in 
specific projects. But for this to happen, participation has to be real. It 
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must impact on the decision-making process and be organized in such a 
way that solutions can become achievable. Too often though, participation 
is reduced to mere attendance at seminars or filling in questionnaires, 
identifiable with what Arnstein (1969) calls “mock participation”: those 
forms of involvement, in other words, that may take on a symbolic 
character (guaranteeing a semblance of equity through some working 
group or other, etc.) but are structured as a kind of concession (cushioning 
strategies) where action is effectively improbable (Mannarini, 2004). 
Thus far we have spoken of the role that intermediate institutions can 
have from the ‘top down’ with respect to citizens, associations, 
municipalities, etc. But intermediate institutions can also have a ‘bottom-
up’ role, in influencing the organizational rules of higher institutions 
(Region and State). This aspect underpins a third contribution that 
intermediate institutions can make in favouring community development: 
to create a “dialectic on equal terms” between methodologies, sensibilities 
and organizational models of communities and macro-level institutions. 
In particular, it was Zucker (1988) who developed a sophisticated and 
complex model to explain the processes of institutional influence. The 
starting point for Zucker is that not all institutional forms at macro level 
are transmitted to micro levels, and neither is the reverse always true. In 
other words, institutional orders are loosely coupled systems in which the 
different levels are interconnected by weak links. The resulting 
divergences derive precisely from social and institutional differences 
between the levels. At micro level, relations are direct, or in any event 
conducted with scant mediation. Macro levels, by contrast, are based on 
formal elements (rules, laws, articles of association, etc.). A mutual 
imperviousness is created between these two levels. According to Zucker, 
when cohesion and association are created at the micro level, this erodes 
legitimacy at the macro level, as the effect is to introduce elements of 
variety and differentiation typical of local regulatory orders, at higher levels, 
thereby increasing the degree of systemic unpredictability. 
According to this model, there are persistent tensions between national 
and local institutional processes that have the effect — to borrow the 
terminology used in systematics — of polarizing morphogenetic forces (pro-
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change) identifiable with local systems, and homeostatic forces (pro- 
stability) identifiable with national systems. In this sense, the “subversive” 
role of intermediate institutions stems precisely from that constant need to 
underscore their independence and specificity. 
 
 
3. The contribution (and limits) of Local Action Groups 
 
Local Action Groups could be considered, in the terminology of Chavis et 
al (1986), as “community animators”: intermediate agents operating 
between citizens and institutions, tasked with building a sense of 
community through the action of local leaders, who can trigger actions 
planned by the territory accommodating the language and the rules typical 
of Community culture on the one hand, and of the institutions on the 
other. 
The primary mission of LAGs, in effect, is to create a social support 
network not only between ordinary members of the public, but above all 
between production companies, trade associations, stakeholders and 
administrators. With this purpose in view, network experts speak of 
“strong links” that are conducive to genuine cohesion and positive 
resolution of conflicts. However, it has been seen that a strongly cohesive 
group also risks becoming insular, incapable of engaging the community 
and likely to experience serious difficulty when faced with changes in the 
surrounding environment. Moreover, groups of this nature tend to 
exercise regulatory control in an often oppressive manner, with non-
compliance on the part of members considered as deviance. In particular, 
Granovetter (1973) shows that in reality, it is the “weak links” that provide 
the true engine for change at mesosystem level. According to this author, 
micro-level and macro-social interactions are influenced by one another, 
and weak links allow actors to convey suggestions, open dialogue and 
experiment with ideas in new situations, far more easily than is the case 
with strong links. We believe that LAGs provide the ideal setting for the 
creation of these weak links, the more so since business and institutional 
actors tend to favour organizational styles that are formal, and little 
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inclined to set up concertation tables. This potentiality, however, is offset 
by the bureaucratizing tendency to create “egocentred” networks, where 
partners in the plan have relationships with the LAG more than with one 
another. In this situation, the network becomes isomorphic to the 
organization of LAGs and passive to the extent that it functions merely as 
an enquiries desk, a bureaucracy consultant. Consequently, LAGs would 
no longer have the ability to network any bank, municipal office or 
provincial government department. 
To facilitate the construction of weak links, the LAG can count on the 
nexus of familiarity between management and activities in the territory. 
The fact of being a proximate institution makes the LAG a kind of 
‘guarantor’ in relations between entrepreneurs, municipalities and 
individual citizens. But if on the one hand the activity of LAGs is under 
constant scrutiny from the beneficiaries of its actions, and from citizens 
themselves, then on the other, this direct relationship between the LAG 
and entrepreneurs and politicians can help to strengthen powers already 
acquired. In short, the LAG could become yet another élite lodge through 
which power is exercised by the local bourgeoisie. In effect, it is no secret 
that LAGs have become intermediaries for local interests, lying as they do 
in the middle ground of a complex system of institutional powers 
(Regional and Municipal), business interests and social and territorial 
pressures. Thus, they have become a party between parties, a crossroads of 
interests, possessing none of the regulatory powers available to Municipal, 
Provincial and Regional authorities. They have only the privileges of the 
intermediary, the de facto coordinator of Municipalities having the power 
to issue measures. This equilibrium undermines the effective “authority” 
of LAGs and favours strong interference on the part of political and 
institutional organizations.  
Favouring weak links, therefore. But also developing corporate social 
responsibility, and with responsibility, participation. 
In the previous section, we discussed the fundamental role that 
intermediate institutions can play in mobilizing citizens through a bottom-
up process. In the case of LAGs, this opportunity can take on an original 
and innovative quality, given its particular public-private configuration. 
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Firstly, LAGs can/must involve citizens especially in the initial stages of 
planning or in the concluding stages, when evaluating actions. The aim is 
two-fold: designing LDPs to meet the economic and social needs of the 
particular territory, and creating the foundations of an active and 
innovative citizenry. But, as we know, LAGs are also set up by industrial 
concerns, trade associations, entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations, etc. 
Accordingly, participation can occur not only through ordinary members 
of the public — i.e. individuals or organized groups having no direct 
economic interests — but also through the mechanism of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In effect, businesses are encouraged to adopt 
sustainable and socially responsible patterns of behaviour (Bansal, 2005; 
Engle, 2007; Welford and Frost, 2006), considered to be important strategic 
levers for furthering their economic progress, and for social and 
environmental development, that is to say sustainable development 
(Elkington, 1997). Under the banner of corporate social responsibility, 
moreover, businesses are called upon to rethink their role in society, 
offering themselves as socio-economic agents, contributing to human, 
civic and social progress of the community. In essence, CSR consists of 
“integration on a voluntary basis, by firms, of social and environmental 
preoccupations in their commercial operations and relations with 
interested parties” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 
2). This definition implies a “social” and “community” value to doing 
business and is an aspect that epitomizes phenomena such as social 
inclusion, belonging, trust, cooperation, equal opportunity and active 
citizenship: processes that move businesses beyond the role of mere socio-
economic agents, making them communities marked by solidaristic 
relationships (Amerio, 2004), focused on building inclusive social 
networks and promoting wealth (Hutton, 1995). 
If, on the one hand, being the member of a LAG means hoping for a 
direct — or at least smooth — line of contact with the Regional authority 
or with managers of economic resources, on the other it signifies being 
part of an enterprise network with a strong community-oriented vocation, 
seeking to do business in a sustainable and responsible manner. LAGs can 
therefore provide the arena for this “social contract” between enterprise 
 56 
 
and society, whereby businesses become responsible not only for the 
effects of their policies and actions, but also in respect of their ability to 
improve the quality both of social life and of the environment in which 
they operate (Maignan and Ferrell, 2000; D’Aprile and Talò, 2014). 
But in our experience, LAGs are too often limited to a participation that 
is little more than “window dressing”. Citizens have never truly had the 
power to influence the chain of decision-making, and neither have 
businesses genuinely set up a network cooperating to secure the wealth of 
the community and the relaunch of an integrated masterplan. With this in 
mind, it could well be said that the “constraint of participation” has been 
thought of more as an item to be ticked off on a check-list, than as a true 
social mandate. And that LAGs are still perceived as “something between 
local councils and businesses”, with members of the public seen as 
background noise, or even as possible sources of disturbance. 
How is this failure explained? We referred in the previous section to 
isomorphic tendencies, or rather the tendency of organizations to assume 
similar management structures or administrative philosophies. In this 
light we might suppose that, over the course of time, LAGs would have 
assumed the same implicit rules as those of superordinate structures. 
Di Maggio and Powell (1983) describe three mechanisms by which 
these isomorphic tendencies are engendered: coercive, when a given 
institutional form is imposed by pressure from above — the case, for 
example, of a national government imposing certain modes of operation 
on local governments — mimetic, when under the  stimulus of 
competition, certain units imitate the organizational formats of other units 
seen as being successful, and normative, when an organizational system 
acquires legitimacy of itself and is perceived as being the most suitable for 
addressing certain situations in the estimation of experts or professionals 
in the sector, who “rubber stamp” its validity whether actually effective or 
otherwise (Rogers, 1983). The impact of these three mechanisms — 
compounded by the institutional weakness of LAGs — has been to 
determine the progressive convergence of organizational models toward a 
single model: the regional. As a result, the localist, and consequently 
heterogeneous vocation of Local Action Groups, has been corrupted. The 
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tendency toward entropy — spontaneous, and typical of the territory — 
has been countered by that institutional work deployed at higher levels 
(Zucker, 1988). And so, in the virtuous conflict between the 
morphogenetic forces of the LAGs and the homeostatic forces of the 
Region, it is the latter that have prevailed, leaving LAGs with little other to 
do than oversee the implementation of measures and procedures. 
Participation is a topic of abiding interest not only for the effects 
produced on economic and social development of the community, but 
more generally, for the resilience of democracy. The disinterest in 
participation shown by the institutions, and by single citizens, raises a 
number of questions as to the vitality of the future that the territories can 
expect. The measures of intermediate institutions can become a unique 
setting for the realization of a narrative originating in cooperation and 
innovativeness, built jointly by parties who feel bound together by a 
common political and territorial identity. More exactly, a shared narrative 
(Mankowski and Rappaport, 1995), a united movement by which a group 
of individuals is transformed into a community. 
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